The first weeks of 2025 have already seen a paradigm shift in geopolitics less reminiscent of a strongman President flexing his muscles on the world stage and more like the Sino-Soviet Split. A continued trend of traded blows between D.C. and its traditional allies in North America and Europe has rapidly formed a world where the nations of the West find themselves without the security guarantees from Washington that they have come to rely on. The UK, while having surprisingly defended the ‘special relationship’, now finds itself in a world with a US that is no longer a reliable ally – but a nation that can quickly become an adversary with little notice. And while much of the traditional news coverage has handled Britain’s future role in European defence, the UK remains a global power – and that means that British defence policy must adapt to handle not just Russia but China and Iran alone.

Looking to the Pacific, Britain’s position is weak. With the infamous Chagos Islands Deal (handing over the islands to Mauritius and paying the Mauritian government for a 99-year lease on the strategically vital Diego Garcia air base), Britain is set to lose a crucial basing point for operations in the Pacific at a time when the People Republic of China’s (PRC’s) hard power capabilities in the region are growing at an alarming rate. With the US now demonstrating a willingness to renege on security guarantees with its allies, the nations of the Pacific now find themselves isolated in an increasingly tense area of the world. Our ties to this region run deep, and in the absence of an external supporter, we cannot afford to allow some of our strongest economic, cultural, and military partners to face the PRC alone. Holding down a gateway to the Pacific is of critical value if we are to have a say in the future of the world. A world with no remaining force to counter potential Chinese aggression is one where the UK is forced to play second fiddle to greater powers, and that world should not be considered an option. Whether one is more interested in preserving their own sovereignty or protecting the rights of other states to preserve their freedoms, there is little reason why the UK should not be investing more in countering the PRC. Instead, we make moves to distance ourselves further from that potential conflict. With the British armed forces now preparing for great power conflict once again, there is no longer a need to distance ourselves from active competition against the PRC as we appear to have done in the first quarter of the 21st Century.

However, there are other dangers closer to home, one such danger being Iran. Tehran’s status as a regional power is in flux, and with it, the UK finds itself in a novel crisis. While the UK and the Islamic Republic have not traded blows (save for rumours of British air defence activity over Syria during Iran’s April 2024 strike against Israel), an Iran stuck firmly on the backfoot is more willing to make desperate decisions. With reports of an accelerated effort toward a nuclear breakout, the UK now finds itself in the unenviable position of having to deal with a rogue nuclear state in the vicinity of not just NATO allies but Britain itself (through the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs)). The UK must be willing, capable, and ready to engage in military action against sites in Iran that can be used to manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons to prevent the unthinkable. The foundations of this capability, while certainly not fully developed, are present. The Royal Air Force has conducted a sustained bombing campaign (Operation Shader) in the Levant, operating out of RAF Akrotiri in the SBAs for over a decade now and has, on multiple occasions, struck facilities related to the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction in Iran’s now deposed ally - Assadist Syria. The RAF has the know-how and several bases it can operate from. What the UK requires to remain an assertive and relevant power in the Middle East, and to ensure the security of British sovereign soil from a potential rogue nuclear state, is more funding for standoff munitions to be stored in the region, as contingency for if the worst does indeed come to pass.

Of course, no discussion on British foreign and defence policy can exclude Russia, even if Europe is not under the microscope. Moscow has had a hard time maintaining its international footprint without reliable allies or surplus manpower, but nonetheless, Russia continues to cling to its title as a world power. And while the bulk of Russia’s hard power sits on the frontlines of Ukraine as the Kremlin reels from the loss of a crucial ally in Syria, Russian mercenary groups continue their reign of terror in Africa, from Libya to Mozambique - led by the exiled remnants of the disgraced Wagner Group Private Military Company. With the fall of Syria, much of Russia’s Mediterranean forces have redeployed to the shores of Libya in a bid to secure the victory of pro-Russian warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya’s civil war. This news has gone unreported in light of more sensational headlines, but this news will be raising alarm bells amongst European military leadership. NATO has done little to fortify Europe’s ‘soft underbelly’, and with this surge of Russian forces defending the Mediterranean Sea has become just a little harder, stretching an already porous NATO frontier to its breaking point. Simply sitting back and waiting for Russian mercenaries to pave the way for a permanent, overt military presence in Libya for Putin is unacceptable and fool-hardy. The time to remove Russia’s influence on our southern flank is sooner, rather than later, and while this should be the responsibility of our Mediterranean allies this entire paradigm shift should have made one lesson abundantly clear: we must be willing to enact change independently and without foreign assistance, even while we (rightfully) deepen ties with Europe once more.

To conclude, Starmer and the Labour Government have made the right move in ramping up measures to counteract Russian aggression, revive the British armed forces and revitalise our defence industry to prepare for war on the continent. Nonetheless, as is often the case with the government in the UK, it is far from enough. Aggression against the UK and its interests comes not just from Moscow, but across Eurasia and the Pacific. 2.5% of GDP towards defence spending in three years is barely sufficient to bring the current armed forces up to standard, it is not enough for a major war on the continent, and it is a droplet in an incredibly large puddle to defend our interests globally, as the UK continues to claim it is willing to continue. It will be a tough pill to swallow, granted, but it’s a pill we must be willing to take to keep up with the state of this new world. Defence spending must increase far beyond current targets to keep ourselves safe in a globalised world, no matter where the threat lies.