“Whoever governs Singapore must have that iron in him or give it up”. Rousing words from former Singaporean PM Lee Kuan Yew in 1987. But what does this mean, and is this iron Singaporean model of governance an example for other states around the world? 

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1963 and splitting from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore’s unique style of state-led capitalism has turned the small city-state into one of the most well-governed states in the world. The World Bank’s global governance index ranks nations on six criteria of governance; in five of these six Singapore ranks in the top five in the world - in two it is ranked in the top spot.

Singapore has achieved this largely due to the vision and success of the People’s Action Party (PAP), which has continuously been in power since independence. The PAP has become the envy of political parties around the world and has won every election in Singaporean history with no evidence of electoral irregularities. This has been largely due to its continued effectiveness, popularity and strict control of the media and political opposition. As a de facto, yet for the most part legitimate, one-party state, the PAP has been afforded the capability to carry out its long-term visions for Singapore in a way that governments in similar developed democracies would struggle to achieve. 

The Singaporean state has become one of the most efficient due to its highly meritocratic system; in many states, governments struggle to attract top talent due to the inability to compete with private sector pay and conditions. However, in Singapore, wages for ministers and civil servants are high, with some earning around $1-2 million for the highest offices to draw the best talent and not be outgunned by the allure of private sector salaries. A common issue with nations such as the UK is the inability of the government and civil service to attract the crème de la crème of talent due to the simple fact that they can earn far more outside of the public sphere, leaving the state with a second-best workforce that lacks the intellectual capacity of the private sector. High salaries allow the Singaporean government to attract the best and brightest on offer and remain more competitive with the private sector. 

Singapore is unique in the fact that it is a city-state, a model that has largely died out throughout history. This does lend itself to a centralised government due to the city-state’s small nature; other larger nations that have more cultural diversity, with more complex regionalised histories and political pasts, will struggle with being governed by an all-powerful, heavily centralised state. Nations adopt federal systems for a reason, as they often provide greater and deeper political representation in more politically and culturally diverse countries such as the US. But in a small geographic region, with a small population, such as Singapore, this is unnecessary - the centralised institutions of the state are able to support. 

Singapore takes a uniquely stringent approach to its anti-corruption methods as well. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, an independent government force so proficient in cracking down on allegations of corruption that it would have Boris Johnson breaking into cold sweats, ensures that all sectors of Singaporean governance across both the public and private sectors remain honest and transparent. In 2020, a minister in the Singapore Civil Defence Service was sentenced to 22 months in jail on account of accepting bribes from a defence corporation seeking government contracts. This exemplifies the nature of Singapore’s commitment to the rule of law and moral integrity in its governance and shows that the ivory towers of public offices will not protect individuals from the force of the law, a feature often found desperately lacking in other developed states around the world. The CPIB has what some may argue to be excessive powers to investigate and clamp down on individuals accused of corruption: powers to arrest, search, seize and control financial assets without a warrant or immediate judicial oversight would have Western politicians squirming. This is just another example of Singapore’s commitment to moral integrity and transparency in the governance of the state. 

It's only natural to question the methods of the CPIB and ask if the ends justify the means in these cases; ultimately, it depends on each individual’s beliefs on the role and powers of the state to decide when powers become excessive, but there are undoubtedly benefits to the Singaporean model of anti-corruption methods. The speed and ferocity of the CPIB’s procedures are far superior to those found in the UK where while perceived corruption is called out by the public and media, it seldom comes to significant legal or formal repercussions. In most cases, the best outcome is that mounting pressure results in a ministerial sacking or resignation. Formal Parliamentary methods of rooting out corruption and governmental malpractice are burdened with slow processes, red tape and the absence of executive powers. The Singaporean model seeks to reduce this as much as possible, sacrificing democratic oversight for ruthless efficiency and efficacy. 

However, Singapore is not without fault, and while this may seem to be a glowing report of Singapore thus far, there remain extensive issues within Singaporean society and politics. Singapore has long been branded by academics and commentators as an ‘illiberal democracy’, where, while it has some of the hallmarks of a typical democratic state (frequent free elections and democratic institutions), it has long been criticised for the dominance of the state in all aspects of society and politics. The PAP has built the state with the primary purpose of promoting stability. However, this actually means that the PAP has rigged the system to ensure that it remains in power and minimises opposition by whatever means necessary. The state has kept a strong tie to the media in Singapore, which may go some way to explain the convenient nature of how the PAP is given consistently favourable coverage. While we in the UK may feel our freedoms have been under attack by incremental changes to rules surrounding protests, our ECHR-protected laws would, by comparison, appear to be a form of open-season democratic freedom for Singaporean activists. All protests and assemblies must seek and gain government approval. What few gatherings are granted still remain exposed to police presence, whose powers are extensive. This significantly limits the liberal values and freedoms that we enjoy in the West. Furthermore, the draconian libel law in Singapore means that the Government has grounds to sue and silence any opposition voices who have the audacity to offer any criticism, meaning that opposition to the PAP is limited at best. Between the friendly media and limited opportunity for formal and informal political opposition, it is as good as non-existent, leaving observers unsurprised when in elections the PAP romps home with significant majorities in parliamentary and executive elections. Therefore, the title of ‘illiberal democracy’ seems fitting, as while it has the institutions of a truly democratic state, the lack of civil liberties that are enjoyed in the majority of other democratic states around the world is stark and should not be underestimated. 

Even if one could attribute the successes of Singapore to this model of illiberal democracy, it would be too bitter a pill for many to swallow; many would likely prefer to enshrine their freedoms rather than see them diminished for the sake of government efficiency. In the interest of balance, it should be said that this is very much a Western, lefty-liberal critique of alternative approaches to governance. Lee Kuan Yu famously criticised liberal values and branded them incompatible with those found in Asia and outside of Europe and North America. He cited a duty to maintain the stability and security of the nation and community, suggesting this duty came before individuals’ rights and freedoms in what was a rejection of the radical individualism deployed in the West since the 70s. While this doesn’t excuse abuses or the excessive use of state power, it serves as important context for a political culture so different from our own. 

So, in answer to the original question, is Singapore a model for other states around the world? In short, no. While it remains a marvel of what can be achieved from modest means, it is certainly not for mature and highly functioning democracies in Europe and North America, where progress, stability and security have not had to come at the cost of civil liberties. It could serve as inspiration for some developing states in the democratisation process, but even beyond the moral and philosophical issues surrounding Singapore, there are practical limitations to the implementation of a Singaporean model of the state - the model of a highly centralised state such as Singapore’s only really works in a geographically small nation. Despite the impressive nature of its efficiency, methods of dealing with corruption and clear commitments to transparency, it cannot be said to be an exemplary model of the democratic state in 2025.