The Growing Threats to European Democracy
10/04/25
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MARINE LE PEN PRESENTS HER PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMME, IMAGE: NDFRAYSSINET
Over recent years, many European democracies have been confronted by the rise of fringe political parties with polarising ideological positions, begin to compete with established, mainstream parties. Although the rise of the Radical Populist Right has been the most overt example of this, there has also been some growth and successes in radical left-wing movements and political parties on the European continent too, which are perhaps less well documented. Some of the basic reasons for the rise of such parties include: a reaction to the Eurozone crisis and the impacts this has had on member nations; growing Eurosceptic sentiment; a want for greater border controls and a perceived ineffectiveness of incumbent governments from the centre ground, among other factors, all of which will be explored. I will examine several examples of such parties, with a major focus on Germany, as well as a brief look at an existing example – Orban's Hungary.
Recently, the increased threat posed by Radical Populist Right parties across Europe was once again made worryingly clear in the German Federal Elections, when the AfD came 2nd and ahead of the incumbent Social Democratic Party (SPD) with over 20% of the popular vote. The AfD’s rise in German Politics has been dramatic. It began as a breakaway party in 2013, opposing Merkel’s response to the Eurozone crisis and were also critical of European Economic integration policy as a whole. They failed to meet the 5% threshold needed to attain seats in the Bundestag in that year’s federal election, but following the takeover of the national-conservative wing of the party in 2015, which took the party to a more radical position on many policies, particularly immigration, they reached the Bundestag in 2017 with 94 seats of the 709 available and on 11.5% of the vote. In 2021, the AfD fell back to be the fifth party in a hotly contested field of six parties that won seats in the German legislature. However, over the next four years, the AfD managed to effectively double their share of the vote and leapfrog all the parties involved in the collapsed Scholz government – the SPD, Greens and the FDP – who lost all their seats after failing to attain 5% of the popular vote.
The Scholz government, like many other incumbent governments around the world over recent years had been dealt a very tough set of circumstances – the economic impacts of a once-in-a-lifetime global pandemic, the first war in Europe for over seventy years (and the domestic impact this conflict has had), slowed economic growth, and irregular migration patterns into Europe to name but a few. These pressures were simply too much for the coalition to bear and damaged all three participating parties in the process. Meanwhile, the AfD were able to capitalise on these themes and the discontent many felt towards the outgoing administration and achieve a result which could put them on the precipice of power in 2029, if the new coalition, which is likely to be a ‘grand coalition’ led by Friedrich Merz of the CDU/CSU alongside the SDP, are unable to deal with the economic and social issues facing Germany. What should also be extremely concerning for the prospects of the 2029 election is that it appears many younger voters voted for the AfD, where previously the younger vote tended to go to the Greens and the SDP. It is too early, however, for definitive theories about why this is the case, yet I would put forward that the anti-establishment vote, which tends to be higher amongst younger people, switched from the Greens to the AfD over this election cycle after the Green participation in government.
OLAF SCHOLZ SIGNING DELOR'S BOOK OF CONDOLENCES, IMAGE: LUKASZ KOBUS
A final point worth noting about the AfD is that their vote is heavily concentrated in the regions formerly part of East Germany. This is perhaps because the AfD is largely pro-Russia and shares much of Trump’s criticisms about the Ukraine war and is also critical of the NATO alliance, a cornerstone of European security since it was established shortly after the Second World War. These two examples of a frankly dangerous foreign policy stance often associated with this school of political thinking could deter the AfD from gaining more support, particularly in the west of the country. Merz, on the other hand, has pledged that any government he leads will increase defence spending and will work closely with European partners to strengthen the continents defence capabilities, stating in his election night victory speech that Europe must “achieve independence” from the USA, as it is an ally we can no longer rely on to defend our interests.
Although Germany has been the focus of this piece, the rise of radical right-wing parties has also been evident in both France and Spain. In France, the Le Pen name has been synonymous with the French right for several decades, but over recent years, the Rassemblement National (RN, the National Rally, formerly the National Front) has grown in support and is now the single biggest opposition party in the French legislature. The growth in support for the RN has coincided with the breakdown of the centre ground in France, which began when President Hollande made the ill-fated decision to break many of his manifesto pledges and continue Sarkozy’s austerity measures in response to the impacts of the Eurozone crisis. More recently, Macron’s centrist coalition Renaissance has faced much public and political opposition due to a number of unpopular reforms, the catalysts for the political chaos seen during 2024, which saw a Prime Ministerial merry-go-round as Macron desperately tried to get a grip on the legislature.
Out of this political turbulence, many had tipped Le Pen, twice defeated by Macron in the runoff ballots in 2017 and 2022, as a favourite to succeed him when his second term expires in 2027. Indeed, in most opinion polls of preferred candidates, she held a strong lead over two of Macron’s former Prime Ministers, Edouard Phillipe and Gabriel Attal, who are seen as potential centre-ground successors to Macron. However, on March 31st, 2025, Le Pen’s long-standing ambitions of achieving the Presidency were dashed when she was banned from standing for public office for five years after being found guilty, alongside 24 other RN officials, in an embezzlement case. Alongside the ban, Le Pen was also handed a four-year sentence (although it is unlikely she will serve any time in prison) and fined.
It is thought likely Le Pen will appeal the judge’s verdict and denounced the decision to ban her as a “political decision” when she appeared on national television the night of the verdict. However, even if the ban on her running for public office is lifted, the appeal process could be lengthy, and the RN may have to prioritise a new candidate to run in 2027. It is widely expected that the candidate would be Le Pen’s prodigy, 29-year-old Jordan Bardella, whose accession to the top of the party would be fast-tracked.
Opposition to Hollande’s austerity measures and Macron’s recent attempts at domestic reform has also led to a surge in support for the far-left in France. Jean Luc-Mélenchon and his Nouveau Front Populare (NFP) alliance unexpectedly won the most seats of all the blocs in the Assemble Nationale in the snap 2024 legislative elections. However, due to the Gaullist system of the French President appointing the Prime Minister, this did not translate into any executive power. Mélenchon had previously nearly defied the odds in the 2022 Presidential election, where he came 420,000 votes short of beating Le Pen to the runoff round against Macron.
In Spain, the rise of the extreme right has come through the form of Vox, a socially ultraconservative party that opposes same-sex marriage and abortion whilst openly calling for the deportation of thousands of Muslims in the country. Vox’s rise has been incredibly quick, and they have been able to capitalise on the political instability Spain has experienced over the last decade, going from winning their first representation in Andalusia in 2018 to being the third largest party in Spain in the 2023 General Election, despite losing seats from the previous election results from November 2019.
VOX VALENCIA RALLY, IMAGE: VOX VALENCIA
Across Iberia in Portugal, there has been a similar rise for another right-wing party, Chega. However, recent opinion polls have shown Vox’s support to be about half of the PSOE (Partidio Socialista Obrero Espanõl, the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party), but still comfortably the third party in Spanish politics with Chega stalling at around 17%, again comfortably the third party but not a threat to the two major parties ahead of May’s Portuguese legislative elections.
If any of these parties reach power, it would not be the first liberal democracy domino to fall in Europe, however, it could lead to a significant acceleration in the populist radical right’s accession to power in many European states. The most overt example of a present illiberal democracy in Europe is Hungary, led by Viktor Orban since 2010. He is very open about the policies he has implemented, describing the country he has presided over for 15 years as an “illiberal Christian democracy”. Hungarian elections are mostly free and fair, but restrictions on press freedom, particularly on its coverage of opposition parties, give his Fidesz Party a real advantage. He also made reforms to the judiciary, reducing the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62, which purposely weakened judicial independence in the country. And even if a change of leadership in Hungary was to occur that wished to return the country to a liberal democracy like most of its European neighbours, due to laws implemented during the early Orban years (2010-14), it would be incredibly difficult to do so as Parliament must vote two-thirds in favour of repealing these bills. These are a few brief examples of how Orban has transformed the Hungarian political system and was a far cry from some of his earlier policies that included signing Hungary up to NATO in 1999 alongside Poland and the Czech Republic.
My concluding thought to this piece is simple. Those in political office and those of us who hold liberal democratic values dear must put forward a positive case of what liberal democracy has done for us and the profound dangers of losing such important values, instead of addressing these parties indirectly and giving them more of a platform and heightened credibility.
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